process and the three policy formation channels described by John Kingdon. Simply stated, Oregon administrators aggressively utilize the high courts in their search for the acceptance and legitimization of faulty and socially unacceptable penal policy as they seek to alleviate prison overcrowding and/or to manage and punish inmates. Thus, a "fourth stream" in the policy formation process is being utilized -a process which has led to a great deal of what we might call "administrative evil" (Adams & Balfour, 1998), i.e.,
[The] needless human suffering directly caused by the operation of administrative processes in which the manner used and the ethical implications of the ends they served have been severed while the ethical import of the means themselves is also treated by administrative actors as irrelevant (Bud Kass, personal communication, March, 2002) .
Perhaps in identifying and labeling administrative evil as "banal," Hannah Arendt (among numerous others) has mischaracterized a process that is far from "routine" (Miller, 1998) . As Bernard Williams notes, "the modern world...has made evil, like other things, a collective enterprise" (pp. [1] [2] [3] [4] . Similarly, as John Kingdon (1995) asserts, the contribution of administrative specialists in the policy formation process is often far from routine and very often an aggressive and collective enterprise. In this paper, one of my concerns is with how administrators are able to develop and implement highly destructive social policy while working in collaboration with the high courts. Specifically, I focus on how administrators in the Oregon Department of Corrections are able to utilize Interstate Compact agreements to both individually punish inmates and to reduce the fiscal impact on the organization caused by an exponentially growing number of inmates. I also investigate the role the high courts play in legitimating what would seem to be rather patently unconstitutional penal practices. Simply stated, I argue that a "fourth stream" policy formation process exists in which the courts uphold and legitimate the activities and wishe s of "hidden participants" (Kingdon) -a process that is missing from John Kingdon's "three-stream" model of policy formation. This "fourth stream" in the policy formation process is the product of communities of specialists who are able to legitimate the implementation of faulty policy ideas. As I will show, it is through the high court system that hidden participants are able to gain support and legitimacy for a number of fiscally and socially irresponsible corrections policies that often remain hidden from the public, elected officials and other democratic stakeholders. In short, faulty policies that would normally be "culled" in the other policy streams are given new life by the high courts.
In order to show how the courts play a critical role in the formation of corrections policy in Oregon, as well as on the national level, I have divided this paper into five sections: a description of Kingdon's "three streams" agenda setting and policy formation model; a description of the Oregon Department of Corrections and the needs that drive hidden participants to create new policy; a description of Interstate Compacts and the evolution of their purpose; a summary of court cases directly related to the evolution of Interstate Compacts and the underlying rationale for the courts to act as a "fourth stream" in the policy process; and a concluding summary of my findings. It is through this case study of Oregon Department of Corrections and their use of interstate compacts that I hope to show that not only is administrative evil very rarely banal or routine, but that the intentional, entrepreneurial actions and faulty policy proposals of hidden corrections participants can be legitimated solely by the high court in a "fourth stream" policy formation process. In short, I am proposing that the relationship between public administrators and the high courts constitute an important "stream" in the policy often place their agenda item at the top of the list with little negotiation or the need to be overly persuasive (p.199). As Kingdon asserts about the political stream, "The combination of national mood and elections is a more potent agenda setter than organized interests" (p.199).
The third policy stream, according to Kingdon, is best seen as a sort of "biological natural selection" where many ideas are present but only the strongest survive (p.200).
Important in this third stream of the policy formation process is the way in which "order is developed from chaos" through alternative specification, or rather, through policy "alternatives, proposals and solutions" that are generated by narrow communities of specialists (p.200). Thus, and as Kingdon asserts, the criteria for judging an idea "include technical feasibility, congruence with the values of community members, and the anticipation of future constraint, public acceptability, and politicians' receptivity" (p.200). However, though Kingdon asserts that policy ideas that do not meet these criteria do not often survive, I will argue below that there is a fourth stream in which communities of specialists are able to legitimate the implementation of faulty policy.
Simply then, according to Kingdon, if we are to understand how agendas are set and/or public policy altered, it is useful to conceptualize three streams of competitive political discourse in which agendas and/or policy alterations are developed or recognized, tested, rejected, modified, and/or implemented. Important to the potential success or failure of an agenda item or policy change, asserts Kingdon, is the coupling or uncoupling of the agenda item in one policy stream to another. That is, "a complete linkage" of the policy idea in all three streams into a "single package" will most likely ensure the success of that idea. In describing this process, Kingdon writes:
[...] Entrepreneurs concerned about a particular problem search for solutions in the policy stream to couple to their problem, then try to take advantage of political receptivity at certain points in time to push the package of problem and solution (Kingdon, p.202) .
In addition to these three processes, Kingdon describes the role of visible participants (e.g., the President, Congresspersons, etc.) and hidden ones (e.g., scholars, analysts, administrators, etc.) in these processes as well as the narrowing of potential policy alternatives by hidden participants through alternative specification. Simply, he describes alternative specification by hidden participants as the winnowing and discarding of faulty policy alternatives by a narrow group of specialists. Although the impact of visible participants on policy is important, the focus of this paper is on the impact -often aided by the high courts -which hidden participants have on public policy. Understanding the fact that not all faulty policy is "winnowed" out, and in fact, is often used as policy of last resort, is key to understanding the fourth policy stream. Similarly, understanding the high court's role in sustaining faulty or destructive penal policy -developed and implemented by hidden participants -that should have been culled in the policy stream by relevant experts, academics, and specialists is also significant.
Oregon's Problem: Full Prisons and a Lack of Money
In the 1990's, Oregon was on the horns of a dilemma: build more prisons at great public expense or continue to send prisoners out of state to low-bidding private or public prisons? Oregon administrators were (and are) willing and able to do both. Through very creative financing and inmate export strategies, supported by numerous high court rulings, Oregon administrators have and continue to be able to implement policy strategies that would normally be culled in one of the policy streams explicated by Kingdon. Much of the current literature describing the organizational behavior of prisons and jails is focused on one concern: overcrowding. That is, the behavior of corrections officials and administrators is determined by their need to either increase their inmate holding capacity and/or otherwise increase their ability to manage a rapidly growing number of inmates (Segal, 2001 ; U.S. Department of Justice, 1991 Justice, & 2000 . Through numerous and creative policy ventures, Oregonian administrators have continued to find policy solutions that "work" in the short term but have failed to find an affordable, humane, long term solution to the problem of overcrowded prisons. One of the practices preventing Oregonian administrators from developing a more humane solution to prison overcrowding (e.g., putting pressure on the legislature to go easy on its "get tough on crime" focus) is the "modified" use of Interstate Compacts for inmate export. The court's acceptance of a state's right to use interstate compacts as a way to punish or shuffle inmates between jurisdictions has given corrections administrators and other hidden participants an additional tool in their effort to manage overcrowding.
Oregon's use of the high courts as a way to implement and experiment with faulty penal policy can not be fully explained without a brief description of Oregon's need to manage a rapidly growing influx of inmates and the expenses incurred by this influx.
That is, Oregon, like many (or most) other states, was faced with an exponentially growing number of prisoners in the last decade and did not have enough space to accommodate them all. As the Rockefeller Institute (Boyd & Jenny, 2002) and by forcing the system generally to become more resourceful in managing its resources (see Appendix B). Measure 11 also forces the system to work outside of the normal democratic process in order to obtain the resources that it needs to manage an exponentially growing prison population. In summarizing the budget literature produced by the state of Oregon, it would seem that Measure 11 (ORS 137.700 and 707) which was passed by voters in 1995 and ORS 137.717 which was passed by the legislature in 1997 to mandate minimum sentences for property crimes, are the primary drivers for Oregon's continuing need to expand penal capacity at the state and local level (see Appendix A).
Unfortunately, the money needed to do this has not often been available and prison officials and administrators have had to be creative.
One approach to the problem of overcrowding in Oregon is to build more prisons.
Unfortunately, the number of facilities and related services required to meet Oregon's penal needs is quite expensive, and will in fact cost Oregonians $100 million each see Appendix A). COPs require no taxpayer approval, because technically they are not long-term debts. In fact, COPs are an "off-balance sheet" debt in that the state does not technically own the prison that is being constructed. Rather, Oregon leases prison space from private corporations and thus, the interest payment on construction debt incurred from prison construction is not considered a long-term debt (see Appendix A). Finally, though the money for this prison construction does not come out of the general fund, the $100 million debt service due every biennium, as well as the cost of leasing the prison space, does -thus reducing the general fund by $50 million dollars per year to pay for facilities that the state does not actually own. Interestingly, one of the private correctional facilities utilized by various state corrections agencies is currently under criminal investigation for a similar, off-books funding approach .
However, the use of COPs has been tested by the Oregon Supreme Court and, according to the Western Prison Project, is "under certain conditions ... legal" (2001, p.1; see Appendix A). Specifically, the court has ruled that in order for COPs to be legal, the state legislature has to be given the option to fund the debt service or not -the debt service payment cannot be mandated. Additionally, each set of COPs must be specifically approved by the legislature and must be managed by the State Treasurer's Office. However, though there are conditions to this rather creative financing approach to prison construction, it would seem that corrections administrators have successfully legitimated -through the high courts -a prison financing policy similar to the one that recently sank Enron (and millions of investors). Thus, it seems that hidden participants in The five pieces of legislation -to include the U.S. Constitution -that relate to the use of the interstate compacts in Oregon are: the Constitution (Friendly, 1984, p. 288-89 Compact act was necessarily a federal act of Congress due to explicit constitutional constraints on interstate agreements (Friendly) . However, many states have since successfully entered into a variety of interstate agreements -some of them modeled after interstate corrections compacts -that cover a wide variety of issues (e.g., energy, fire suppression, environmental, etc.) (Hogan, Hitt, & Schmidt, 1996) .
The Original Interstate Compact Act of 1937, as well as the replacement Interstate
Compact Act of 1997 do not explicitly allow for the exporting or trading of incarcerated inmates from one state to another. Rather, they merely allow for a legal exchange of services aimed at monitoring paroled offenders from different states. In essence, the Interstate Commerce Acts (1937 & 1997) allow -under specific conditions -paroled or probationary prisoners to travel from the state of conviction to another state participating in the compact. Additionally, the 1997 compact agreement allows law enforcement to travel to a compact state to pursue or expedite the extradition process (Minnis, see Appendix B). Similarly, Oregon's HB 2393 (a simple boilerplate compact agreement signed by all compact states) merely makes the agreement between states more specific and stronger by, in part, allowing states to sue each other for breach of contract.
However, ORS 421.245 (2001) does state explicitly that "confinement" can and will be shared among states. Thus, as the correctional needs of Oregon changed, so too did the
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The Fourth Stream 13 legislatures use and interpretation of the interstate compact tool. However, the use of the compact for interstate inmate exchanges and inmate exports by Oregonian administrators predates Oregon law by a number of years. The question as to who moved recently to make this change in Oregon law is rather murky, but it is clear that this policy innovation had been put forward and practiced by hidden participants within Oregon's corrections bureaucracy for years prior to codification -a practice fully sanctioned, and thus legitimated, by the higher courts.
The Courts and Interstate Compacts
Howard Gillman writes that courts are quite capable of partisanship and Randall Kennedy asserts that the courts can be downright corrupt (Gillman, 2001; Kennedy, 2001 ). However, Teri Peretti defends the court's right to be partisan (Peretti, 1999) . In fact, Peretti asserts that a partisan court is necessary, and furthermore asserts that:
It is only through the exercise of its power, through judicial activism, that the court can give effect to its alternative representation and thereby add to or improve on the efforts of other institutions to achieve a meaningful consensus. (p.222).
Peretti also asserts that, "each institution has some degree of independent power, although not complete power, to force the inclusion of 'their' interests or constituency into the policy process" (p.222). Thus, courts as an institution interacting in a hyper pluralistic environment must act and/or make decisions based upon their own interests or, it would seem, the interests of other institutions it sees as being excluded from the policy process -especially those it sees as a "constituency," such as corrections. This is the reality that hidden participants utilize when pushing faulty corrections policy to the point that it is tested, and ultimately legitimated, in the high courts. In other words, Peretti has explicated the underlying rationale for the courts to act as major players in a "fourth stream" process of policy formation.
There are a number of high court cases that show how the court has consistently upheld the actions of corrections administrators attempting to creatively and aggressively implement new and potentially destructive penal policy outside of the policy stream.
However, the origins of inmate "sales," exports, or trades are fairly murky and the origins of this practice do not reside in explicit law so much as it does in a variety of court decisions allowing the practice to continue. Having said that, it appears to me that the Olim v. Wakinekona (1983) is a case directly related to the legitimation of administrative policy created in a vacuum, or rather, away from the rationalizing forces of the main policy streams. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the administrative practice of shipping "troublemakers" to out of state -indeed, "overseas" -correctional facilities. In an attempt to manage inmates designated as "troublemakers" by administrators at Hawaii State Prison, these administrators implemented an interstate and overseas transfer of inmates to a California correctional facility. In supporting this policy innovation, the Supreme Court held (in part) that: In an interesting twist of legal reasoning, the Court also ruled in this case that, "even when, as here, the transfer involves long distances and an open ocean crossing, the confinement remains within constitutiona l limits" (p.2). Based upon this reasoning, one can only speculate on the future of policy innovations by prison administrators (e.g., the exporting of prisoners to third world prisons because they are cheaper).
In an Oregon case -Ghana v. Pearce (1998) A state compact is transformed into federal law and thus may be the basis for a S. 1983 action, when it falls within the scope of the compact clause, has received congressional consent, and its subject matter is appropriate for congressional legislation. The Compact failed the third test... the Compact's procedures are therefore purely a local concern, and there is no federal interest absent some constitutional violation in the treatment of prisoners (pp. 3-4) . 
Conclusions, Findings and Outlook
As John Kingdon asserts, the contribution of administrative specialists in the policy formation process is often far from routine and very often an aggressive, collective enterprise. However, the collective enterprise identified in my case study shows only that public corrections administrators and the courts work together to create public policy with very little (if any) input from the policy process streams identified by Kingdon.
Clearly, it is through the high court system that hidden participants are able to gain support and legitimacy for a number of fiscally and socially irresponsible corrections policies that often remain hidden from the public, elected officials, and other democratic stakeholders. In short, faulty policies that would normally be "culled" in the other policy streams are given new life in the fourth stream by the high courts. Simply stated, there is a "fourth stream" policy formation process at work in Oregon and nationally in which the courts uphold and legitimate the activities and wishes of hidden participants -a process that I found to be missing from Kingdon's "three stream" model of policy formation (Kingdon, 1995) . to find a way to fund its school system during the next biennium). Potentially disturbing to me about the "fourth stream" policy formation process utilized by the Oregon Department of Corrections is its ability to produce socially unjust and/or fiscally irresponsible public policy with an astounding regularity. In short, the "fourth stream" would appear to be patently undemocratic and reserved exclusively for defective policy.
That is, the "fourth stream" -immune as it is from democratic or constitutional norms and professional critique in the policy formation process -is a stream in which hidden participants are able to utilize defective public policy. Simply, by utilizing the "fourth stream" policy formation process, hidden participants in Oregon corrections are able to bypass the democratic process, avoid damaging political fallout from more humane corrections policy, and have effectively detached the means they use to achieve goals from the value-rich ends for which they were empowered to achieve. Furthermore, the repeated adherence to a "fourth stream" policy formation process indicates a desire by Oregon's corrections administrators, as well as the high courts, to do what is politically expedient rather than what is humane and rational, or even constitutional in some cases.
As evidenced by a recent proposal from an Oregon legislator to "hot bunk" inmates (i.e., double bunk inmates so that they are forced to take turns sleeping) (Sarabi, 2002) or the legal notion that it is constitutional to ship inmates overseas (Olim v. Wakinekona, 1983) , there is, clearly, an alarming amount of damage that can be caused by an over reliance on the "fourth stream" policy formation process by public administrators. systems (including the Federal system) because he complained too much about needing dentures and other "mundane" or "non-essential" personal requirements. Compacts -Interview with Bridget Sarabi, activist and organizer, Western Prison Project, April 9, 2002: Statement 1: * Interstate compacts and contracts: The practice of contracting out large batches of prisoners to "low-bidding" correctional facilities in other states have been disallowed by the legislature due to abuses (though they can authorize this practice again at any time). However, "compacting" prisoners on a case-by-case basis is still allowed. Statement 2: * Previously, Oregon "sold" large batches of prisoners to other states due to
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